BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER

1966

IX 38-1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

25 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Recipients of International Conference Information

SUBJECT: Change in Service Pattern for Information on International Scientific and Technical Conferences

1. Effective 15March 1966 reduced resources will require a service pattern change for the (historical) International Scientific and Conference file currently maintained by the Biographic Register, Office of Central Reference. As of that date, S & T Conference service will be decentralized as follows:

a.) The S & T Conference file will be located in the Mezzanine Vault of the CIA Library and will become an inactive file. Personnel will be available to retrieve documents from the file for perusal in the Library.

b.) Classified intelligence reports dealing with conferences, dated 1 January 1966 and onward, will henceforth be indexed according to the Intelligence Subject Code and will be retrievable through the Intellofax System by organization or conference title. (Such classified information reports were previously filed in the S & T Conference file.)

c.) Dissemination of unclassified Library of Congress material on forthcoming International S & T Conferences will be continued by the Document Division, OCR, to the same consumers.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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d.) Copies of unclassified documents not contained in the inactive S & T Conference file can be obtained from the Library of Congress through the CIA Library.

2. Questions concerning the reorientation of service can be directed to the undersigned (Extension 7997).

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[redacted]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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.IV-3-f-1
File

21 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Reference

FROM: Chief, Biographic Register
Office of Central Reference
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: OCI-BR Coordination Discussion,
[redacted] 25X1
17 June 1966

1. [redacted] called at approximately 9:30 to suggest a meeting 25X1
and arrived about 10 minutes later. Our discussion lasted about 45 minutes, possibly one hour. According to [redacted], the purpose 25X1
of the meeting was to discuss coordinated handling of requests to OCI involving biographic production and the proper allocation of responsive work to avoid duplication of effort. None of the other more basic and far-reaching aspects were involved except when they were introduced, almost in the context of "other problems" by the undersigned. The tone: low-keyed and amiable throughout.

2. [redacted] began by explaining that Mr. Godfrey had asked him to meet with me to discuss methods of avoiding BR-OCI duplication of effort such as that which resulted in the [redacted] instance. 25X1
I pointed out that the "Vietnamese civilians" and [redacted] pieces were the other two most recent examples of unnecessary duplication. 25X6
[redacted] said he regarded the subject as a simple matter of co- 25X1
ordination; a problem mainly arising from multiple channels through which the requests were received. We agreed that it should not be difficult to establish some control within OCI to assure coordination 25X1
with BR when a biographic contribution was involved in an OCI request, and that the desk level was probably the point at which coordination could best be assured (i.e., subsequent to the issuance of a directive. I remarked that such coordination had always worked when White House requests were involved and I showed him our copy of OCI Notice N 50-61, 12 July 1963 (Biographic Intelligence Support to the White House). He expressed considerable surprise at the contents, said he had not previously known of the document and doubted very much that Mr. Godfrey had. He made a note of the Notice number and said that he would show it to Mr. Godfrey when he reported to him on our discussion. Mr.
25X1 [redacted] concluded by saying he saw no problems.

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3. Also discussed- but very briefly, almost incidental to the "main topic":

BR's access to SI and DD/P files- I assured him that such information was included whenever required and to the extent -in the case of DD/P- that they would release it;

Relations with OCI- I said it was my understanding that the professional relationship at the desk level was mutually good, although admittedly I was "not privy to the results of the recent evaluation survey of BR's service and reports" (His response: "Oh, generally quite good" with an occasional complaint of spottiness, which I attributed "to turn-over-itis," a disease which also afflicts OCI);

"Orchestration"- a theme which had recently been directed at them but not in the biographic context, rather regarding OCI-ORR coordination.

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4. Mr. [redacted] said he would call me regarding any future developments.

25X1 [redacted]

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1 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interim Arrangement Between Biographic Register OCR and OCI for Production of Finished Biographic Intelligence

To avoid duplication of effort and misunderstanding regarding responsibilities for the production of finished biographic intelligence reports on foreign personalities, the following procedures have been agreed upon pending the promulgation of a more formal arrangement.

In fast-breaking situations (such as the overthrow of an established government and the installation of a new regime), OCI will prepare and disseminate an intelligence report on the key personalities involved. In preparing this report, OCI will 1) immediately notify BR that it is doing so and request BR's assistance, and 2) endeavor to relate in the report pure biographic information to the situation as it appears to be developing.

In cases where either BR or OCI receives a specific request from outside the Agency or from within for formal biographic reports, the receiving office will inform the other of the request without delay and will arrange with the other for whatever coordination appears necessary or desirable. When the deadline is extremely short, (i.e., 1 - 2 hours), this procedure may be waived.

In instances where either BR or OCI thinks it desirable to initiate biographic reports in anticipation of forthcoming events (i.e., without a specific request), it will notify the

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other office of its intent and will solicit cooperation in the preparation of the reports.

The arrangement for biographic intelligence support of the White House as detailed in OCI Notice N 50-61, 12 July 1963, will remain in effect.

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Chief of Special Staff
Current Intelligence

Approved:

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Chief, Biographic Register, OCR

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ADMINISTRATIVE — INTERNAL USE ONLY

28 July 1966

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director of Central Reference

SUBJECT: 25X1

1. Work sheets and input forms have been developed (samples attached).

2. A total of six and three-quarter man days are currently being expended in the Register to cull pertinent information from and transfer it to work sheets in clear text. To date have been exploited. STAT

3. On the basis of early evidence it is estimated that the information will require an average of some 75 IBM cards which will then be converted to magnetic tape. Seventy five minutes has been estimated as the punching/verification time for each set of IBM cards. STATINTL

4. At 1500, 27 July, Messrs STATINTL met with Messrs to discuss coding and punching details. No problems.

5. It is impossible at this time to estimate time-of-completion with any degree of accuracy. My own guess is the end of calendar year 1966 unless a considerable number of trained people are added at the beginning of the line-- STATINTL

Chief, Biographic Register

STAT

Attachments

ADMINISTRATIVE — INTERNAL USE ONLY

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12 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Reference

SUBJECT: Clarification of BR-OCI Coordination Paper

REFERENCE: (Draft) MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD (Agreement Between OCR and OCI for the Coordination of the Production of Finished Biographic Intelligence), 19 July 1966

1. Subsequent to the approval of your draft by the D/OCI, it was agreed that two additional details required clarification; namely, the level at which the coordination is to be effected and definition of the types of production requiring coordination.

2. WHERE- It is strongly indicated that the most practical point at which the coordination can be effected remains the desk analyst level. This we should press for: that the analysts speak for -i.e., coordinate for-- their respective offices. This need not preclude the establishment of internal procedures which might require the analyst to first consult with a higher official. (At least initially, in the Biographic Register all matters involving consultation will be considered by the division chief). If the desk level coordination principle is approved, however, it is imperative that the principle be officially announced as office policy and that all analysts be directed to implement the procedure. Of even greater importance is the need to spell out to all analysts the mutually-approved definition of what constitutes "coordination."

3. WHAT- It should be emphasized that as specified in referenced (draft) memorandum of agreement, only that material which will appear as DD/I finished --i.e., an Intelligence Memorandum or Intelligence Report-- will generaly require coordination.

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This would include material requested by the White House (even specific White House requests for biographic information only would automatically be coordinated with OCI by BR). Thus a joint publication would result from any request levied upon, or any self-initiated effort by either office when such a joint effort was deemed desirable. When deemed not desirable, either office would then issue its own publication. In either case, it should be full recognized that BR will prepare the biographic material-- either as a contribution or an issuance of its own.

4. Initial efforts to clarify the details concerned above should be informal.

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Chief, Biographic Register

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16 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Agreement Between OCR and OCI for the Coordination of the Production of Finished Biographic Intelligence

1. PURPOSE

To provide for the coordination between OCR and OCI of finished biographic intelligence publications.

2. DEFINITIONS

a. Finished Intelligence Publications

Finished intelligence publications, as defined in DD/I Notice No. 5-100-7, dated 15 April 1966, consist of Intelligence Memoranda, Reports, and Handbooks.

b. Coordination

The cited DD/I directive states that "Finished intelligence is usually fully coordinated within the DD/I and with other Directorates as appropriate. In the exceptional case when a publication reflects the views of a single component or individual, this will be noted in a foreword or in a footnote to the first page of text."

c. Producing Office

The cited directive states further that "the producing office will be identified in a foreword or in a footnote on the first page of text."

3. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Biographic Register

The Biographic Register, OCR, has been assigned CIA's responsibility under DCID 1/9 to produce biographic intelligence (except military) for the Intelligence Community.

b. Office of Current Intelligence

The Office of Current Intelligence has been assigned the responsibility for the production of current intelligence but also possesses certain interests related to biographic production; for example, in connection with its role in White House support. (See OCI Notice N 50-61, 12 July 1963.)

4. PROCEDURES

a. Requests

In cases where either OCI or BR/OCR receives a specific request from outside the Agency or from within for a formal biographic report, which will be issued as DD/I finished intelligence, the receiving office will promptly inform the other and production of the report will be undertaken by BR/OCR in accordance with its assigned responsibilities. BR will undertake to coordinate the report with the interested OCI analysts (and with other offices as needed) and a notation of the nature and extent of this coordination will be included in the foreword or in a footnote on the first page of the text.

b. Self-Initiated Projects

In all situations requiring the production of self-initiated finished intelligence reports or memoranda (whether they are fast-breaking or provide a considerable lead time), the respective analysts in OCI and BR will immediately confer

to assure coordination of effort; i.e., OCI will prepare the current intelligence reports, if necessary, relating the situation to the people involved, and BR will produce the biographic reports. Both offices will work together to insure that there are no substantive inconsistencies in the materials thus produced. If the material is published in a single DD/I report or memorandum, the office series reflecting the predominant character of the publication will be used, but both producing offices, and the extent of coordination between them, will be noted in the foreword or in a footnote on the first page of the text.

c. White House Support

The arrangement for biographic intelligence support of the White House, as set forth in OCI Notice N 50-61, 12 July 1963, a copy of which is attached, will remain in effect.

d. Biographic Handbook Series

This series, although defined as finished intelligence, is considered to be "scheduled production" and, as such, is not included in the weekly DD/I Production Report. Except for the informal analyst-to-analyst contacts now in effect, no special OCI/BR coordination is required.

JOHN K. VANCE
Director of Central Reference

Attachment

Concurrence:

_____ _____
E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR. Date
Director of Current Intelligence

IV-3-f-1

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7 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, [redacted] 25X1

THROUGH: Director of Central Reference

SUBJECT: OCR Comments: Proposed Program for [redacted] 25X6

REFERENCE: Draft Memo to Director, INR and Director, DIA, dated 1 September 1966

1. I consider the proposed program excellent and long-needed. I recommend that it be implemented as soon as possible with maximum support by headquarters.

2. Implementation of the program should produce an increased workload for the Biographic Register. However, until the scope of the program can be measured (the extent of increased processing 25X6 resulting from the [redacted] 25X6 25X6 as yet of unknown length; or the extent of the "commentary" to be required of BR for each list) it will not be possible to determine the impact on BR.

3. In submitting the comments you requested, I would first recommend that paragraph (1) of the memorandum to D/INR/State contain a reference to the fact that the proposal follows the lines previously explored by Ambassador Johnson. I feel strongly that this would have a positive effect. A copy of his memorandum to Chief, BR/CR, could be attached. Secondly, I think it would be

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highly desirable (and politic) to add to the same memorandum a reference to the Foreign Service's biographic reporting program and the role of the Biographic Coordinators. To wit, and continuing from the end of the first sentence in paragraph (3):

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4. Additional, and equally strong recommendations:

a) that a senior headquarters officer be appointed to direct the program, preferably with USIB support and authority;

b) that a reporting form simpler and shorter than the DOD Biographic Reporting Form 1396-1 be used, possibly one like the attached sample (long, detailed reporting forms psychologically repel the collector);

c) 25X1

d) 25X1

e) that the memoranda be addressed to the heads of the departments involved and carry the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. I would also suggest that the action officers involved convene to consider final drafting of referenced memoranda and other pertinent subjects.

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Chief, Biographic Register, OCR

Attachments

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President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
Washington, D.C.

FIFTH DRAFT REPORT

of the

BIOGRAPHICS SUBPANEL

of the

GUIDANCE AND EVALUATION PANEL

* * *

Dr. Anthony G. Oettinger
Subpanel Chairman
Mr. John Griffith, Consultant

This document consists of 64 pages,
No. 10 of 25 Copies, Series A

S & T Control No. 1254

Group I
This Document Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification.

October 1966

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents (Con't)

* Codeword Section. Full Text in OST Files.

Table of Contents (con't)

V. Appendices

* Codeword Section. Full text in OST Files.
**Expurgated copy -- Full text in OST Files.

Table of Contents (con't)

V. Appendices

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INTRODUCTION

The Subpanel on Biographics, like the whole Guidance and Evaluation Panel, faced the question of how to provide increased technological support for the information processing activities of the intelligence community. The technological problems presented themselves as inextricably woven into the pattern of information use and, therefore, into the structure of operations, management, and management policy.

The rapidly increasing growth rate of information in the national data base obviously generates a need for additional resources to aid in processing and using this information. What may be less obvious is that the potential information pool is practically infinite and hence the rate of improvement in information processing is directly dependent not only on the rate at which new technological approaches are introduced, but also on increasing top management recognition of the fact that effective information processing policy must be one of its basic concerns. This policy must take into explicit account the need for selectivity created by the evident hopelessness of ever marshalling "all" relevant information.

The intelligence community has extensive resources of modern science and technology at its disposal now. The rate of advance in information handling technology is itself increasing. Moreover, the community already has a strong capability in applying automatic data processing

techniques to information file and communications problems. The community is, therefore, in a good position to apply these resources before the magnitude of the data base outstrips human capability to process and use it effectively.

Biographics is one area that seems amenable to thoughtful systems design, and where indicated, to the application of modern information processing technology and methodology. This Subpanel has studied the applicability of systems analysis and automatic data processing to some of the problems found in the biographics area. In the process, we have examined biographic files and their settings, both in and out of the intelligence community.

We conclude that the total biographic capability of the intelligence community is a strategic national resource and as such requires attention which will strengthen it and develop it into a more cohesive activity. We believe that judicious application of information processing technology can continue to provide improved coordination among the various files and agencies whose units contribute to this capability.

Our findings and recommendations follow.

I. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Major Findings

A prompt joint attack on biographics problems is held back mainly by top management's inadequate attention to the handling and using of information. Lacking sustained top management direction and support, the intelligence community as now made up and run has been able only to pay lip service to coordinated effort. No technological roadblock strong enough to thwart a well-informed and resolute top management appears on the way toward any useful degree of automation. Rather, the so-called "realities" of organizational politics have spawned either manic faith in machines or depressive withdrawal from modern opportunity. Information technology adds new tools to management's kit. Forging an alloy of old and new that's right for the job is top management's real task.

B. Major Recommendations and Criteria for Meeting Them

1. Make and implement a plan for developing a community-wide biographic capability.

A plan for developing a community-wide biographic capability with the highest professional standards of performance should be submitted to PFIAB through the Director of Central Intelligence, exercising his statutory responsibility, by 2 January 1967. Provision of adequate resources and action to carry out such a plan must follow with the highest priority.

For such a plan to dispel the fog that sweet talk of unity casts over a fundamental parochialism that has precluded effective collective action,

it must substitute action initiated, supported, guided, and reviewed, at a level of authority at least equal to that of the Director of Central Intelligence, without undue regard to artificial lines drawn around a narrow concept of "the intelligence community". The plan must provide for:

a) Focusing attention on organizational problems.

There is a strong need to focus attention on vital problems of definition of users' needs, systems analysis and design, and top management policy, direction and control, instead of frittering it away on arguments over such profundities as the matter of how many columns of a punched card should be allocated to a name.

b) Improving the technical competence of line management.

The community must establish technically competent lines of management, responsive to user needs and supplied with rational system performance and cost data -- now almost totally lacking -- in order to guide the selection, collection, storage, and retrieval of information in an environment where the ideas of sampling and statistical confidence must overtly displace the vain ideal of completeness already abandoned in apparently random practice. More clear-cut line responsibility for decision and action on information processing is needed than now seems available through the United States Intelligence Board and its directives.

c) Establishing a forum for the open exchange of professional ideas, to ensure that the sound, valuable, but fragmentary ideas generated in earlier community studies be given a genuine hearing leading to the vigorous exercise of top management decision-making responsibility (in place of the current practice of generating committee recommendations reduced to a lowest common denominator); and to ensure that the results of isolated experiments be broadcast within and outside the community, evaluated critically and impartially, and, when found valuable, applied in response to vigorous top management direction.

Full and free means for consultation among biographic and information processing specialists in the various agencies must be established. These may take the form of semiannual or annual meetings, or newsletters, or journals, or any other suitable media. Any barriers to open discussion (such as security) must be explicitly justified.

2. An adequate formulation of the plan must include detailed and specific criteria against which its accomplishment can be measured.

The following are suggested for inclusion among these criteria:

a) Open access. Any member of the community (broadly construed) shall have free access to all biographic file indexes. There shall be an explicit and simple appeals mechanism against denial of access to files for security reasons.

b) Rapid response. Response time between origination of a request and a response satisfactory to the requester shall not exceed 24 hours, but design should generally be aimed at 15 minutes or less.

c) User Feedback and Management Information. Explicit provision shall be made for providing information to management concerning

1. Use and value of sources
2. File content and overlap
3. Cost versus risk analysis of file security precautions.

d) Rational File Conversion. Explicit provision shall be made to prevent indefinite accumulation in conventional files of material best stored in computer files. The extent to which older files are or are not to be converted must be specified.

e) Index and File Centralization. Management must be provided on a continuing basis with information for deciding on an appropriate balance between physical index or file consolidation and dispersion. Criteria for decision shall be based on maximum effectiveness (both present and future) to users and on least cost, without regard to existing agency jurisdictions.

f) Effective use of Community Experience. Several of the techniques used in the examples which are appended to this report should be considered in the development of a plan for community-wide biographic capability. In particular, the [redacted] program,

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the [redacted] name variant technique, the [redacted] program should be explicitly evaluated and any wanting features discussed with their authors. Machine testing of these techniques is naturally a part of any satisfactory evaluation.

In addition, any other techniques still hidden in the community and outside should be considered and tested, when possible, by actual machine runs. Evidence must be given that planning and implementing staff have free access to information within limits dictated only by the real need to safeguard national security.

g) Compatability and Standardization. Those parts of the plan which deal with mechanization must specify the guides that will be used for interchanging data either in standard format or any free form that is appropriate. As is discussed later in this report, no sanction is to be given to useless harping over details of format that are not serious obstacles to data interchange, nor is there any need to attempt the adoption of a single community-wide standard in order to thwart progress toward making and implementing the plan.

h) Personnel Education. The plan must include specific provisions for training and promoting personnel with professional systems analysis qualifications into the ranks of line management. It is expected that these personnel will be used in such a way that the professional capabilities of biographic and information processing system staff will be upgraded to a level making future reports such

as this unnecessary. Training programs should provide for selected personnel to spend time in universities as resident students.

More detailed recommendations and criteria are more appropriately reserved to the systems design process itself. The remainder of this report aims to make more specific, amplify, and document the conclusions which made our recommendations and criteria necessary.

C. Background of the Report

This document is the report of the Subpanel on Biographics of the Guidance and Evaluation Panel created under the Special Assistant to the President for science and Technology, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, in response to a memorandum to the President by the Chairman of the PFIAB (CLIFFORD).*

The Clifford memorandum charged the Panel with responsibility for:

1) "Providing guidance to the intelligence community in the forwarding of methods and facilities for information handling and access;

2) "Evaluating in technical terms the true meaning of the enormous and somewhat heterogeneous growth of the intelligence community's information pool."

The memorandum then goes on to say: "It is emphasized that the proposed Panel of technical experts would not be tasked with the too-obvious

*Capitalized expressions refer to corresponding entry in the bibliography.

assignment of simply applying modern machine methods to the existing, specialized, and rigidly-maintained activities of processing and distributing information within the intelligence community. The Panel would have the overall task of guiding the necessarily large and presently ignored planning for the realistic and long-term development of mechanized facilities for the processing of information in the manifold forms in which it is encountered within the intelligence community."

Adhering to this spirit, the Subpanel has not hesitated to seek information outside the confines of the intelligence community narrowly interpreted as participants in the United States Intelligence Board.

The Panel was given an extensive series of briefings and site visits in the major intelligence installations in the Washington area and elsewhere and access to some documents produced by earlier studies.

It quickly became clear to this Subpanel that the whole information processing area, including biographics, has an excellent history written not only by innocent outsiders, but mainly by very able, knowledgeable, conscientious and thorough members of the community itself. Since the Kirkpatrick Report (KIRKPATRICK, 1960), more time has been spent, more detailed data has been gathered, more debate and interpretation has taken place, than any part-time "experts", however well-intentioned, could possibly equal.

Without apology, this report therefore makes very little claim to originality. In the words of Tom Lehrer, "Everything, I stole from some-

where else", including, of course, information gathered from briefings and some more informal site visits.

II. THE BIOGRAPHICS PROBLEM

A. Information Sources for This Report

Throughout this report we shall have occasion to refer to the report of CODIB Task Team V in a draft form dated January 17, 1966 (CODIB V). Although that draft report does not have the blessing of CODIB as of the time of this writing, it nevertheless reflects the concentrated effort of a group of twelve members representing not only the "intelligence community" but also "outsiders" such as the FBI, in gathering and evaluating data concerning the scope of biographic files, the problems associated with creating, maintaining and using them, and, in the words of the statement of objectives of the team, "to identify means for improving the storage, retrieval and exchange* of information from the major name files and related data files in the intelligence community." As of 31 December 1965, members of Task Team V "have reported a total of 3,993 hours devoted to this effort." (CODIB 1966). The Subpanel is most grateful for the opportunity to use the fruits of such extensive labor as well as other related documents detailed in the bibliography, and several supplemental briefings.

There is a major gap in the work of the CODIB Task Team V which, unfortunately, this Subpanel has lacked the time and resources to fill. Although one of the strengths claimed for "the CODIB approach" is that

* Our emphasis.

"participation by officials with operating responsibilities gives greater assurance of utility and acceptance of results" (BOREL 1966, p.6), the report of Task Team V is restricted to technical analyses presented as if there had been inadequate participation by any official with responsibility for seeing to it that the needs of file users are indeed met. The notion of "operating responsibility" thus seems to have been narrowly construed to mean responsibility for operating the files. Since it is now generally accepted that sound systems analysis requires paying attention to the users (and top management paying attention to systems analysis), we see this limitation as a major shortcoming of the CODIB approach.

The impression that this limitation is not mere accidental oversight is reinforced by the following quotation:

> "The SCIPS study group and the panel of consultants recommended the establishment of a permanent interagency body of sufficient size to cover the problem areas. CODIB, however, has rejected this approach in favor of a number of ad hoc panels to be supported by a small permanent executive secretariat (group of documentalists). CODIB not only found excessive* the time necessary to build up a sizable competent permanent group (unless this were done at the expense of promising intra-departmental programs), but considers counterproductive any plan which calls for solutions developed by specialists not themselves involved in departmental information operations."
> [redacted] 1964).

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Since the directive creating this Panel requires it to "supplement the longer range Task Force projects being pursued by the USIB" (CLIFFORD page 2, para. 5), the availability of a report of the relevant Task Force even in draft form is a major asset. It is exceedingly rare for a panel of "outside experts" to have access to such timely data on its subject of

*Sic!

concern, produced by those most intimately acquainted with the problem. The findings of this Subpanel are based in addition on visits to the major files and on discussions with those concerned with their maintenance and use, as well as with the CODIB support staff. We have also specially requested presentations of certain specific technical facts and opinions. These are attached as Appendices 2 through 9.

B. Atmosphere of the Problem.

The members of this Subpanel are clearly outsiders to the intelligence community and hence objects of suspicion. The generality of this suspicion is clear from such examples as one CODIB Task Team urging the acceptance of its recommendations on the quaint ground that, otherwise, the intelligence community "will continue to be vulnerable to external investigative and evaluative groups without having any recognized negotiating position" (CODIB VI, p. 11), further warning that such groups, however well-intentioned, will tend to gather data that are fragmentary, without interrelation, and that they will, therefore, tend to make recommendations that are even more fragmentary and less related to real problems. The warning concludes that, in the process, the outsiders "will remove a thorn and by so doing implant a tumor" (CODIB VI, p. 11).

We recognize some of the sources of such reactions. We have striven to avoid fragmentation by seeking fundamental issues. In particular, we have striven toward presenting the community with a mirror in which it will see itself, not us, by relying extensively on the community's own documents.

It will be made clear in the remainder of this report that we have found both inaction and deliberate inhibition of action by the United States Intelligence Board and its committees to be major factors blocking progress in improving the information handling activities of the intelligence community.

Our major finding (Section I, A) -- that it is the so-called "realities" of the community's internal politics and not any basic technological obstacles that spawn impossibilities in the biographics area and elsewhere -- should not be ascribed to any starry-eyed belief by this Subpanel in the miracles of automation. No degree of automation can compensate for weak management.

C. Definition of Biographics

Various intelligence community and, not to be forgotten, related agencies of the government, maintain extensive biographical files to serve the needs of [redacted] as the case may be. 25X1

The definition of these three major areas is taken from CODIB V, Annex 1:

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[redacted]

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Biographic files within the Intelligence Community include the CIA"s Special Register and Biographic Register (OCR), the CIA's Office of Security and RID, the National Security Agency's files in the Office of Central Reference, the National Security Agency's Office of Security, the Air Force Office of Special Investigation, the Navy and the Army, and files in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department. Major biographic files are kept also by the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Civil Service Commission. Some consolidation of the indexes, at least to certain of the Armed Services files, is evident at Fort Holabird. Additional details on the nature and use of biographic files are given in Appendices 1, 3 and 6. Still greater detail is available in CODIB V and SCIPS 1963.

D. Significance of Biographics.

The importance of biographic files in Counterintelligence and Security is obvious, since these activities are concerned primarily with people. In the Positive Intelligence area, the biographic files are said to play a critical role in support of the evaluation and production of foreign intelligence, but we have not completely verified this. In either group, the collection, storage, and dissemination of biographic material is pre-

sumably not an end in itself.

At present, the different locations and the differences in the uses of biographic files in the various branches of the community lend existing files a considerable measure of apparent variety.

A case can be made, however, that similarities on the whole outweigh differences (Appendices 5, 6, 7, 8). The members of Task Team V, hobbled by terms of reference written without adequate top management guidance and apparently hypnotized by the rigidities of the 80-column punched card, officially see incompatibilities and impossibilities wherever two members disagree over the number of card columns that should be allocated to such data as names or birthdates. This Subpanel sees hope in the fact that the unofficial views of many of the same people are far less rigid.

In the opinion of this Subpanel, the technical problems of biographics are sufficiently basic in contemporary terms to suggest biographic files as a primary candidate for competent and honest experiments designed to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of various positions on the spectra from complete isolation to total integration of files (Appendix 5a, p.1) and from wholly manual to fully automatic procedures. This is not meant to imply that past experimental work on biographic problems has been untoward; rather, the community efforts have been commendable and more experimentation is urged. The criteria for evaluating these experiments should be based on the satisfaction of needs of the community

of users, explicitly formulated as to both substance and security, not on catering to the crotchets of keepers of the files. (Appendices 6, 7, 8).

E. Technical Simplicity of Biographics

The biographics area lends itself particularly well to a study that cuts across the whole of the intelligence community and its allies, in relatively simple yet nontrivial terms. While the problems of creating, maintaining and using biographic files are by no means negligible in comparison with most other files used by the intelligence community, biographic files are a great deal cleaner and better understood (Appendices 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). The biographic files are a very good example of files that are widespread throughout the community and beyond, used throughout the community and beyond, serviced by the whole community and beyond, and which, while relatively simple in structure, present all of the problems of file maintenance in a nontrivial way.

Simpler files such as order-of-battle or installation files exist in various areas but, in general, these are based on a narrower input spectrum than biographic files and serve a narrower area of the community. Because they can usually be rigidly formatted and organized and often accessed through clear-cut keys such as geographic coordinates, their mechanization is well within the state-of-the-art and, therefore, easily accomplished.

We do not wish to understate the ultimate complexity of biographic files. We emphasize, however, that major advances over the present

state of affairs can be made without fear of technological barriers (III, K, Appendices 6, 7 and 8).

The report of the Biographics Task Team states that "no major name index in the intelligence community has yet been fully automated. Therefore, proof of success has not yet been conclusively demonstrated" (CODIB V, p.2). The parallelism between the restrictive phrase "in the intelligence community" occurring in the preceding quotation and in the Task Team's statement of purpose (CODIB V, p. 1) may account for the absence of reference (see also Section III, E) to such files as those operated by the National Driver Register in the Bureau of Public Roads of the Department of Commerce which this Subpanel visited (Appendix 3). This file, now accounting for 860,000 drivers' licenses revoked in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands and Guam, for offenses involving drunkenness or fatalities, got no overt consideration by the Task Team under the headings "major", "fully automated", and "proof of success", or any other heading.

We regard it as most significant that such a central service can deal effectively and efficiently with fifty sovereign states plus other jurisdictions. The degree of trust in the operation of and understanding of its non-deterministic aspects (see the "may be's" in the Matched Driver Record Reports of Appendix 3) is apparently such that the practice of returning no response whatever to the state if a name is not found is generally accepted, with consequent savings in transmission and paper-shuffling costs. Regis-

trars of Motor Vehicles apparently understand and believe that if there is a probable match in the Register, they will hear about it within 24 hours.

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25X1 etc. In the Subpanel's view, these problems are real and serious but in no way preclude immediate automation of a substantial portion of the community's biographic files (Appendices 5, 6, 7 and 8).

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In commenting on the problem of variations in "categories of identifying data recorded if available in the reporting", the Task Team states that it is "impossible to develop rigid rules on what constitutes the minimum identifying data required" and that "each agency, in recognizing these problems and the nature of its own index, forms its own rules regarding minimum identifying data for recording and the depth of search according to the nature of the request." (CODIB V, p. 8). Our site visits and conversations with members of the Task Team suggest that the following exegesis of these comments merits consideration: "Impossible" means politically, not technologically impossible; the "realities" get in the way. "Impossible" perhaps means impossible with punched cards. There is no technological reason known to this Subpanel why only "rigid rules" must be considered, when flexible rules might do and modern storage and logic technology permit their use (Appendices 5, 6, 7, 8). In short, "impossibility" is a thing sired by USIB out of CODIB.

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The foregoing should not be taken to imply that this Subpanel thinks that all the problems of the intelligence community have been solved by the Bureau of Public Roads [redacted] or that "not impossible" is synonymous with "easy". It is, however, clearly implied that there is a need for candid and unfettered professional reporting of facts to an alert top management and for scientific experimentation (Appendices 5, 6, 7 and 8). Why USIB, and hence CODIB, apparently find professional candor difficult may be clarified by exhibiting less inhibited staff comments that require tough management decisions if not spirited away by reduction to a lowest common denominator: 25X1

25X1 "The establishment of the [redacted] concept across the
25X1 board in [redacted] is a management decision which is expected in FY67. If the concept is adopted, then changes in ADP and information processing management will be necessary."* (Appendix 6c, p.4).

"(Transliteration standardization) problems (were) described over a year ago in A/194/65 attached as Enclosure 2 (Appendix 7(b)). The proposal made in that paper was discussed at length by a Working Group on Transliteration set up under CODIB Task Team III and eventually referred to CODIB for further disposition. The development of COINS places the matter of a standard, unambiguous transliteration system for the intelligence community outside the area of academic discussion and poses it as a problem requiring an early solution."* (Appendix 7a, p.3).

"The Joint Research and Development Program for Automatic Language Processing adopted by the National Science Foundation, Department of Defense and CIA is additional evidence that closer coordination (is needed) in working out solutions to basic problems in this area. It is recommended, therefore, that the Advisory Committee for Automatic Language Processing in the National Academy of Science be made aware of the proposal and actions (be) based on it at an early date.

* Our emphasis.

"These remarks are only suggestions. It is strongly recommended that each organization make this decision on the basis of factual, objective information rather than intuition or purely budgetary considerations.* Without standardization and conversion of a minimum number of existing files to the standard, the long-term cost in poor utilization of (1) scarce programmer talent, (2) expensive EDP equipment and (3) intelligence analyst's time and talent will be immeasurably greater." (Appendix 7c, p. 16).

F. Biographics as a Laboratory for Technology and Management.

The Clifford memorandum of June 15, 1966, (CLIFFORD) characterizes the problems of the Intelligence Community in the following terms:

"The problems of the intelligence community in connection with information access and retrieval include, but are not restricted to, those common to all who must maintain very large bodies of information in accessible form. This is even true in the handling of information from unclassified sources. The importance of negative information and of patterns of information requires that access to intelligence information produce a completeness of response beyond that which is expected from many large files of stored information. Like statistics, intelligence cannot be satisfied with the highly anecdotal, but requires that all available items of information are allowed to contribute their part of the final summary or other intelligence product. (p. 3, No. 7).

"As a consequence of intelligence community requirements for high recall, the mechanized and automated means of access to many sorts of intelligence files cannot be required to meet simultaneously rigid requirements as to relevance. Accordingly, for some time to come, the mode of gaining access to intelligence information will be through combined machine-human systems that will seek the machine retrieval of stored intelligence information in order that its relevance may be established by human examination. It is this combined machine-human factor which generates systems problems of great difficulty and dimensions. (p. 3, No. 8).

"In the area of experimental approaches to the adaptation

* Our emphasis.

> of machine processing to the storage and retrieval of intelligence information, an encouraging beginning has been made within the National Security Agency where the Technical Information Processing System (TIPS) study is presently under way. This experiment, although on a limited scale and confined to a selected number of organizational units and information files within the National Security Agency, is producing important lessons for the achievement of a realistic system for the interrogation of a computer by remote users requiring access to a common information base." (p. 4, No. 11).

In addition, Recommendation 2 concerning the Technical Information System (TIPS) project, (CLIFFORD, Page 5) specifically calls attention to the fact that "the capability for extensive handling of the Russian biography problem should be available in the community-wide system by the summer of 1966."

The successful operation of some mechanized biographic systems in CIA, NSA and the Bureau of Public Roads, demonstrates that many technological and security problems normally arising with biographic files or raised by their consolidation, can be solved to a satisfactory degree (See also Section III, K). Our observations in Section III suggest that no insuperable technological problems block coordinated action by the community in the biographic area once management problems are resolved. (Appendices 5, 6, 7, 8).

In particular, biographic files are free of most of the serious linguistic problems which bedevil attempts to handle the finding and retrieval of the extensive textual materials that form the bulk of the intelligence community's files (See Appendices 7, 8). The CODIB Biographics Task Team implies in one of its recommendations (CODIB V, p. 5, Recommenda-

tion 3) that a successful biographic system could form a good basis for approaching these more difficult general retrieval problems through a "coordinated program (which) should be developed using EDP methods to provide machine indexes of the bibliographic data processed by any organization in this field so that the personality information is accessible to a recipient in machine form with quick follow-up to the translated source."

The converse can be equally valid, that biographic indexes could lead back to bibliographic material containing information about installations, organizations, etc., related to the personalities (an example of this occurs in Appendix 6). This Subpanel agrees with the Task Team that coordinated biographic files together, perhaps with installation and organization files, may well form one excellent basis for indexing other holdings of the intelligence community, since curiosity about an individual, an organization, or an installation is so frequently a source of curiosity concerning the more detailed and extensive material that might be in the files.

The Subpanel takes exception only to the mode of implementation proposed by the CODIB Task Team, namely, that another task team or its successor be tasked to follow up on this recommendation. The record shows that CODIB, as managed by USIB, has been singularly ineffectual in getting action on difficult problems. Task teams have operated without real top management guidance or apparent interest, and have developed severely constrained terms of reference conducive to a bizarre and unprofessional frame of mind in which members felt constrained to "go at their task as

CODIB, deliberately avoiding the use of information available to them as individuals." (Statement to full Panel at Briefing of 4/19/66).

The ineffectiveness of the Task Team thus does not seem to be a fault of the Team itself, or of its Chairman, but rather the result of inattention by USIB. One of the most serious potential results of this situation is the slow attrition of professional attitudes. This Subpanel has been consistently impressed with the caliber of the Task Team Chairmen and members with whom it has come into contact, but it cannot rationalize what seem to be such passive recommendations from such active minds. Even within these limitations, serious problems are recognized, statements that strong efforts are required appear, but the process seems inevitably to conclude with the bland, ineffectual statements about cooperation and consensus, devoid of concrete suggestions for action and enforcement of agreement.

The history of CODIB Task Team V yields an illuminating example of that subtle magic. While CODIB itself boldly recommended in February 1964 to "Develop a Biographic Intelligence Processing Plan", (CODIB 1964, p.21, Recommendation 4f), the Task Team's terms of reference as of January 1965 (CODIB V, Annex 6) and the January 1966 Draft Report, conjure up only a limp, eviscerated shadow of this goal in the statement that "the objective of this Team was to 'identify means for improving the storage, retrieval and exchange of information from the major name files and related data files in the intelligence community'". (See also Section III D).

It is equally curious that while it was recognized in 1963 that "the most significant problem in the present period is that of organization",

that "collective efforts within the community will become increasingly important" (BOREL 1963, attachment, p. 2) and that "steps can be taken within the present state-of-the-art to ease some of the current problems" (CODIB 1963, p. 10), such pieties are transmogrified by 1965 into the idea that "attention (and management support)" be given "to improving the individual systems in each USIB agency, with projected compatability monitored by CODIB and the PFIAB/OST Joint Guidance and Evaluation Panel through briefings, demonstrations and discussions." (CODIB 1965 (b)).

The findings of the Task Team VI Draft Report on Research and Development that "security barriers are used quite effectively to barricade against attempts by other agency personnel to acquaint themselves with ongoing R&D efforts" (CODIB VI, p. 13) and that "very few intelligence staffs permit realistic evaluation of their practices or products and results of any evaluation are usually tightly held" (CODIB VI, p. 31), coupled with the absence of observable experiments (Appendices 6, 7 and 8 became observable only with some difficulty, witness Appendix 9) that would support the change of attitude between 1963 and 1965, suggest that this change is not as down-to-earth and common-sensical as might appear at first glance. As of this writing, the report of Task Team VI has yet to be approved by CODIB! Still more bizarre, it appears as if it alone, of all Task Team reports, has already been published! (CODIB VI-a).

The Biographics Task Team observed that, in the positive intelligence area, "every organization has its own standards for selection (from collected material) based on the mission it is supporting and budgetary limitations"

and that "the same source document is frequently processed by different PI organizations." They further remark that "there is an overlap of information in PI files because the different file systems support the same requirements, or because the personality mentioned in the source meets the selection criteria for two different requirements." (CODIB V, pp.13-14).

Given on the one hand that repeated handling of the same document is prima facie wasteful while on the other hand interpretation of the same material from different and possibly conflicting points of view is likely to be helpful and perhaps vital to reliable intelligence production, it is very sad but no longer surprising that the task team felt unable to recommend any approach to this vital problem of top management control, especially since the same problems had already been recognized earlier by the SCIPS Study (SCIPS 1963).

Indeed, a disturbing proportion of the technical people this Subpanel came into contact with seemed overly concerned with details of card formats, while the extent of some management personnel's appreciation of information technology seems typified by such a curious anachronistic statement as "our problems have largely to do with the processing of language, while automatic equipment is essentially designed to handle numbers" (BOREL, 1963, Attachment 1, p.2). There is a vacuum of competent top level consideration of system design problems combining the understanding of needs and of possibilities.

This problem is not altogether unrecognized, as shown by the following expression of the outlook for CODIB:

> "We will need to guard against the ADP tail wagging the information-processing policy dog. But we do need to give more emphasis to technical problems than we have in the past." (BOREL, 1966, p. 6).

The problem is, perhaps, that the tail and the dog have not yet met each other. As for wagging -- while we have repeatedly emphasized the need for keeping the user in mind, we also believe that in a community where information is the most important product, the processing of this information should be far more than a managerial afterthought. The processing of information, automatically or not, has more to do with nerves or blood than with tail, but if pressed on tail, we would insist at least on thinking kangaroo rather than dog.

Where information is concerned, process and substance assume nearly equal weights, and top management cannot safely assume that if it pays attention exclusively to substance the technicalities of processing will take care of themselves. The top and middle managements of most organizations, not only in the intelligence community, were trained in days when information processing was for accountants or scholars, but not for them. The fact that modern information technology affects the very fabric of organizations has achieved some notoriety in The New Yorker cartoons, but has yet to be translated into realistic organization charts. This problem is examined in more detail in Section III, E.

It is the opinion of this Subpanel that the biographics area provides a unique and promising laboratory in which to explore the general technological and management control problems raised by the Clifford memorandum;

and to find out which of CODIB's several minds reflects reality. The technological problems of biographics, while by no means trivial, are not so severe as to becloud the primary organizational and management control problems. The COINS effort may give the rest of the community a chance to catch up with NSA (Appendices 6 and 7).

Any experiment, however, well-intentioned, will be worthless if set up in the present CODIB pattern. The reasons why are evident from the following obeisance by CODIB to the USIB credo:

"We recognize and accept certain constraints upon what can be accomplished by joint action because of:

> the primary responsibility of USIB members to their command channels for carrying out basic departmental and service missions; and,
>
> the impact of the NSC allocation of intelligence collection and production responsibilities among agencies supporting information processing programs." (BOREL, 1966, p. 3).

The deadening effect of the imposition of such administrative litanies is made explicit in the recognition of the following weakness of CODIB and its approach:

> "Common denominator of agreement may be so large as to negate utility of the solution." (BOREL, 1966, p. 5).

That these constraints bring out the worst of ubiquitous bureaucratic tendencies is made plain by the less elegant advice one of our informants assured us applies under the circumstances: "Cover your ass." We can't help thinking that this motto is as inappropriate a slogan for a healthy

intelligence community as "Expose your rear" would be for a crack military unit.

We have, in addition, fair evidence (Appendices 6, 7, 8) that "the system" -- not the people -- is inherently responsible for this sad state. Individuals whose wits seem hopelessly dim in an official light visibly brighten in the sunshine of informality. This phenomenon is common to all organizations but seems pathologically pronounced in the Community. While, once again, we recognize the need for users and operators to exert the strongest influence on systems design, we recommend that members of any group constituted for this purpose be selected for their capability to act according to their individual wisdom and professional conscience, and that they be protected by strong top management guidance against any wrath they may draw from home offices as a consequence. A line manager presented with conflicting opinions instead of bland, lowest common denominator consensus, may then have to make painful decisions (Appendix 6, p.4; 7a, p.1). But we submit that the Community urgently needs additional management able and willing to act in this way.

We do not think that this recommendation is naive and inapplicable. We found it refreshing to learn, at Ford Holabird, that among the very same people who saw only impossibilities, parochial interests and lowest common denominators when acting in a CODIB group, some stopped dragging their feet and leaped into action when given the advantage of a strong management directive issued by the Secretary of Defense who, on May 27, 1965, ordered

them to provide a centralized index to the Armed Services' investigative files by May 27, 1966 (See also Section III, L). Indeed, the job apparently got done. Critics from other agencies are quick to point out that excessive haste has, in their opinion, yielded a product lacking elegance, generality, or power. Nevertheless, the illustration shows that top management has a real choice. Under the constraints prescribed by the USIB credo, CODIB had none.

In commenting on the future (BOREL, 1966 (c), p.4), the CIA's Director of Intelligence Support, currently also serving as Chairman of CODIB, observes:

> "CODIB has been under the same leadership since its inception eight years ago. On general principles, a new look by a new man at the helm is advisable."

Unless the top management structure that has permitted USIB to stifle the professional impulses of the members of CODIB and its Task Groups is profoundly altered, no helmsman is likely to be able to steer a different course.

III. OBSERVATIONS

A. Relative Characteristics of Positive Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Security Files.

Since Positive Intelligence files deal largely with foreign personalities and a substantial proportion of their source material is from open literature, the problems of indexing these files are subject only to the normal technical constraints common in the Intelligence Community, without touching more

delicate areas such as might be raised in the evaluation of uninterpreted data on U.S. citizens. On the other hand, the files appear to be among the more problematic in terms of acquisition, indexing, and completeness.

In the Security files, a goodly portion of the inputs is on controlled forms, often supplied by the individual himself, and positive identification in tags, such as Social Security number, etc., are readily possible.

The Counterintelligence files are constituted from a much greater variety of sources, tend to be far more fragmentary, and their use is more complex and difficult. In these respects, Counterintelligence files are more like PI files than Security files.

It therefore seems reasonable to infer that general solutions of Positive Intelligence and Counterintelligence biographic file problems could be readily specialized and adapted to the needs of Security files, but that the reverse very likely would be far more difficult. These statements are supported by evidence to the effect that PI and CI requests tend to include 20% name finding* and 80% name searching* while in the Security files the proportions are estimated, respectively, as 5% and 95%.

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*The terms "name finding" and "name searching" are defined in the CODIB Task Team V Report as follows:

"NAME FINDING: The searching for name information about one or a group of individuals by looking for data elements other than the name, such as date of birth, position, location, organizational affiliation, occupation, military rank, nationality, including a combination of such factors."

"NAME SEARCHING: Search of indexes or files organized by the names of persons to determine if information exists on the individual, or to validate basic information."

CODIB V, Annex 1, p.1, Glossary.

The study of PI and CI files thus presents the greater challenge to applied research and development as well as a hope of finding general solutions. There is evidence of some original exploration in this area (Appendices 6, 7, 8) but greater top management understanding and support of such efforts is essential to significant and widespread progress.

B. File Overlap and the Single File Problem

CODIB V contains a very rough estimate (p. 2, para. 6) that "there are [redacted] people involved in biographic activity in and out of the intelligence community. Approximately [redacted] at an annual salary- [redacted] are directly involved in work at the index level, in the preparation, maintenance, and searching of the major biographic indexes." 25X1 25X1 25X1

The report then goes on to point out (p. 13, 2.b) that

"The basic criterion of any agency for selecting an item for a PI file is whether or not the item supports the foreign intelligence effort on a particular country or area. Every organization has its own standards for selection based on the mission it is supporting and budgetary limitations. The same source document is frequently processed by different PI organizations ... There is an overlap of information in PI files because the different file systems support the same requirements, or because the personality mentioned in the source meets the selection criteria for two different requirements: e.g., CIA and State have an interest in military personalities who are prominent in other fields such as politics, science, space, etc., whereas DIA and NSA are interested in the same person because he is in the military field. There is no assurance, however, that because a personality is mentioned in a source document that he will eventually be processed into a PI file."

Further on the same report points out (p. 15, 4.c.) that

"Some files are restricted by security classification as to what can be processed. Research in such a limited source file often gives incomplete or outdated information."

The CODIB report further states that

"It is doubtful that any single file, whether it be computerized or manual, can ever be considered a complete or sole source for biographic information."

This Subpanel takes strong exception to this last statement, largely on the ground that it has not been able to uncover the existence of any data produced as a result of a comprehensive systems study concerning either the advantages or the disadvantages of a single community-wide biographics file. (See also Section III, I).

However, the foregoing exception should not be taken to mean that this Subpanel believes that a single community-wide biographic file is necessarily the only means of effective coordination. Since it is evident that a thorough systems study of this idea has not been undertaken, it is impossible to weigh its merits. Nothing that this Subpanel has seen indicates the a priori desirability of this notion, but experimental work that would be of use in such consideration has been suggested by Clifford (CLIFFORD, Recommendation #2).

An obvious conclusion in this matter is that consolidation or at least common indexing and easy mutual accessibility of CI and Security files is technologically feasible. However, the obviousness of this conclusion derives solely from technological considerations, and when more complex factors such as security, utility, etc., are included, a centralized biographic file is not necessarily justified even though it is technologically feasible. The issue of a centralized biographic file was left in limbo by CODIB's departure from its resolution "to develop a biographic intelligence processing

plan" (See Section II, F). Here again, the condition necessary for progress is resolute top management action in supporting thorough professional exploration of alternatives and then exercising its decision-making responsibility.

In the PI area, the technical issues are more confused and, therefore, all the more in need of exploratory investigation. For example, the prevalent practice of scanning PI input materials for names and resolving name variants and name variations before entering the material in files has led (in some cases) not only to a substantial backlog of unentered and therefore unavailable material, but also to the repeated resolution of the same problem by every recipient of the same material.

The alternative of entering materials only once for the whole community, using as a key whatever name variant or variation appears in the raw material and applying name-grouping techniques to draw together scattered relevant material at the time an actual request is made for information, has received only scant attention. Such a task is clearly impractical with manual or older punched-card techniques but not at all ruled out with modern technology. The feasibility, potential dollar savings, and increased information availability that such techniques might provide should be investigated in spite of the specter of centralization. (Appendices 5, 6, 7). Current technology provides top management with a wide range of combinations ranging from maximum decentralization to the level of the individual, to maximum centralization on a government-wide basis. The range should be candidly explored and top management presented with the raw materials for effective decision-making.

The SCIPS report points out that, although "DCID 1/9 allocates responsibility for production of biographic intelligence and the collection and maintenance of biographic data on foreign personalities," (SCIPS 1963, p. 57), various agencies [redacted], maintain substantial biographic files without specific authority under the allocation in DCID. Also, as an aside, it points to an "incidence of many files that are no longer 'input to'." 25X1

The report then comments that "a set of huge files with their implied amount of processing effort is being maintained in a manner not identifiable in terms of DCID functional responsibilities. This is not to say that [redacted] does not have a need for this information, for it manifestly does. Therefore, the inference is that those responsible under DCID are not performing satisfactorily to [redacted] needs or that subject category is not a good way to allocate this responsibility or both" (SCIPS 1963, p. 68). 25X1 25X1

Had CODIB been encouraged by higher management "to develop a biographic intelligence processing plan", some light might now shine on this obscurity. They were not, and therefore it does not.

C. Evidence of Current Automation Efforts

There is encouraging evidence of widespread beginnings of modest automation efforts throughout the intelligence community. Within the CIA the Special Register, the Biographic Register, and the [redacted] system, with its associated indexes, are mechanized to varying degrees and with a variety of different technical and file structure approaches. However, in some of these cases, punched cards were introduced 10 years ago and little 25X1

new and effective has happened since. Wholly or partially mechanized biographic files exist also in [redacted] DIA and at Fort Holabird.

25X1

However, as discussed above (Section II, F), community efforts to mechanize biographic files are fragmented and generally uncoordinated between agencies. In view of the recognized overlap of biographic files (CODIB V, p. 14, para. 2c), it is difficult to understand why a community-wide effort to evaluate the potential support of ADP has not been sponsored by CODIB, except on the hypothesis that top management has been unwilling to sponsor it. Why CODIB V does not recommend such action is clear from the impotent charter and the pressure toward the lowest common denominator resulting from inadequate direction by USIB. The irony of this situation is made plain by Recommendation 8 of CODIB V which states (CODIB V, p. 5)

"The Task Team III (or its successor) be tasked to study those various programs exploiting open source scientific and technical information which generate personality information of positive intelligence value as a by-product. A coordinated program should be developed using EDP methods to provide machine indexes of the bibliographic data processed by any organization in this field, so that the personality information is accessible to a recipient in machine form, with quick follow-up to the translated source." (See also Section II, F).

Apparently, mechanization to achieve community-wide coordination is good in this bibliographic area but not good in the derived biographic area. This Subpanel has not perceived any substantive reason for this distinction, and our recommendations reflect this fact.

D. Need for Applied Research and Development.

There is some encouraging evidence of recognition of the need for applied research, development, and experimental activities in the biographics

area. Among many equally serious problems, the CODIB V report stresses the critical technical problem of dealing with name variants and name variations in name searching through biographic files, especially those with a preponderance of foreign names or even of U.S. citizens in cases where source format control is not possible (see also Section III, B, and Appendix 5).

Problems created by the high proportion of common names in various files (CODIB V, p. 8, item 8) are also recognized, as is the more difficult technical matter of providing usefully formatted identifying data on named or unnamed persons to permit searches of the name-finding type or identification in the absence of names.

Nevertheless, the Panel is encouraged by the finding of the CODIB Task Group (CODIB V, p.11, item 5) that "in observing some of these typical and widely used forms, the Team found that certain basic data such as name place and date of birth, Service Serial number, Social Security number, sex, etc., were included on each form." While this finding applies primarily to the Security files, perusal of the Chart in Annex 4 of the CODIB report indicates that an effort is being made to provide similar fields, even in the Positive Intelligence files, although the probability of no information appearing in these fields is obviously greater. The fact that certain standard elements, blanks in the forms as it were, may occasionally be left empty in some individual forms, does not negate the clear responsibility of defining standard elements even in PI files. The specter of empty fields haunts only those whose thinking is limited to punched cards and it is readily exorcized by more modern techniques.

As pointed out in the Introduction to this report, a major policy issue to be faced by the top management of the intelligence community is how to make most effective use of the technology and methodology available in the nation. In some areas, there will be a need for directing resources toward the development of technological solutions designed especially for biographic information processing problems. In order to guide such efforts, the community will need a coordinated applied research and development program and strong in-house capabilities in specific areas which are not covered in other government or nongovernment agencies. The apparent fact that intelligence research and development under the control of the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) is not necessarily considered part of the community, deserves a deeper analysis which this Subpanel has not undertaken.

The Task Team was barely able even to state the problem under its weak charter. Finding #1 (CODIB V, p.1) states that:

"1. Improvements in the speed and quality of biographic information processing involving interagency exchange on U.S. citizens and foreign nationals are necessary to further improve security, and to afford policy-makers and analysts better response from biographic intelligence files on foreign nationals of interest from a variety of angles - military, subversive, political and scientific. The Team finds that use of computer techniques and interagency telecommunications links may provide significant improvements."

Finding #2 then remarks:

"2. There are, however, profound, complex problems and significant costs in making major changes in the large biographic holdings of community concern, particularly if the changes involve conversion to computer systems."

The inclusion of policy makers in Finding #1 implicitly argues for the importance of the files and the associated problems. The recognition of the profound nature of the problems in Finding #2 implicitly argues for the need for very strong and powerful recommendations for action.

The actual recommendations made by the Task Team are pathetically inadequate when held up against the problem as stated in Findings #1 and #2. However, when the recommendations are compared with the Task Team objective, the fit is exceedingly precise: given weak direction, weak results ensue.

E. The Nature of the Biographics Technological Problem.

There are many biographics problems that can be solved with available technology. However, there is a wide gap between available technology and the community's capability to apply it. It is apparent to the Subpanel that top management should ensure that competence in computer systems analysis be added to the community's wide range of expertise. This competence must be distributed broadly and at every level including the highest. Once a major fraction of community personnel have some training and experience in this discipline, it will become much easier for the community to avail itself immediately and rationally of the benefits of off-the-shelf technology and methodology. Otherwise, oscillation will continue between naive belief in the potency of technological processes and the vain hope that information technology will quietly go away and leave the status quo.

Specific and important benefits should accrue directly in biographic problem areas. In the opinion of this Subpanel, the most immediate and important benefit would be an appreciation by senior management personnel responsible for biographic file installations and their use, of the need for and the nature of well-integrated information technology. With appreciation and understanding would come stronger leadership and better control.

Relatively few of the listed membership of Task Team V had the experience or qualifications of a professional EDP systems or applications analyst. A few others have medium heavy experience, but the rest have very little, if any, experience in applying EDP equipment to major problems. This casts no aspersions on the personnel involved because in the past there has been little need for such experience. Most biographic files were started as manual systems; the need for mechanization is relatively recent. Thus, the lack of highly qualified personnel in biographic file systems may be seen as the root of the lack of intelligent management appreciation of either the scope or the limitations of information technology.

But, even granted the existence of a cadre of highly qualified EDP systems analysts in biographics work, there remain the "profound, complex problems" of Finding #2 (III, D) and these have to be solved. Since these problems combine the technological and administrative they are, therefore, problems for which methodologies or technologies cannot merely be picked off the shelf.

In order to shed further light on these problems, it is instructive to

examine the Task Team Findings (Section III, D) and their statement of the problems.

Finding #1 begins with the clause "Improvements in the speed and quality of biographic information processing... are necessary... " This statement is very good because it emphasizes speed and quality, two of the three basic parameters by which any information processing installation can be measured (the third parameter is cost of resources). The Team further found "that the use of computer techniques and interagency telecommunications links may* prove significant improvements." Since the Team was expert enough professionally, we conclude that "may" is merely a bow by the Team to the "realities" within which lack of USIB direction left it to operate. There is no real doubt that computers and telecommunications links can improve biographic information processing because of the high capacities (bandwidths) of both modern computers and telecommunications equipment.

Evidence, if needed, is found in the fact that some members of the community have already installed both types of equipment (e.g., CIA [redacted] 25X1 and LDX) for separate problems with the belief that both quality and speed are thereby improved. The best evidence for the feasibility of improvement via EDP is, therefore, found within the community itself. This conclusion may also be deduced from an examination of the files themselves. For the most part they are formatted, and even the unformatted files (such as in CIA-BR) offer no technological impossibilities (Appendix 5). Cost of

* Our emphasis.

resources is the most important determinant, barring politics, of course. Only a well-informed management backed by competent systems analysis staff can decide when the adoption of new technological devices is or is not worthwhile and thereby avoid both lagging behind the times and blind keeping-up-with-the-Joneses.

Finding #2 is somewhat more instructive. Here the emphasis is on "making major changes ... particularly if the changes involve conversion to computer systems." This statement distorts the realities of conversion (Appendix 5c). Usually the overall cost of the job is the principal hindrance. The "profound, complex problems" have been solved in several community installations visited by the Subpanel; usually the profound complex problem turned out to be changing the attitude of top management. This change, however, can hardly be charged as a technological component of the systems problem (Appendix 6c, pp. 4).

More to the point, it should be noticed that Finding #2 sees the problems as consequences of making changes in the file installation. In other words, the new file will be a modified version of the old file, and the greater the changes, the greater will be the problems introduced. Our inevitable conclusion is that the best way to solve the problems is to make no changes at all. This aspect of Finding #2 thus gives the coup-de-grace to Finding #1 which weakly states that changes may improve the speed and quality of biographic information processing. The professional systems analyst would not be intimidated by Finding #2, thus leaving the Subpanel

with the conclusion that this Finding was intended for readers who neither are systems analysts nor have them on their staffs.

The remaining Findings offer substantial data for the systems analyst. Findings #3 through #10 present pertinent numerical data that is very useful in deriving a picture of the biographic file problems. Indeed, the problems are great but by no means beyond the limits of technological possibility. Finding #8 is worth a modicum of attention. Despite the implied threat of Finding #2, Finding #8 says that for name searching, EDP may provide improvements, but this statement was apparently considered rash and puerile for it was immediately slugged in the following sentences with the pompous and only tenuously true pronouncement that "no major name index .... has yet been fully automated," (see also Section I, E) thus invoking the threat of Finding #2.

In Finding #10, the body of Finding #1 is still twitching. We are told here that name finding may possibly be improved, but only by exchanging information about "EDP techniques for improving speed and flexibility of response." Notice how the golden "quality" of Finding #1 has been transmuted to leaden "flexibility".

Finding #11 then concludes with a wide-eyed view of the wonderful world of professional interchange. The whole set of Findings reminds one of Franck's Symphony in D, where the good theme jousts with the bad theme. In CODIB V, the bad theme wins, and Finding #11 depicts the rainbow after the storm.

The foregoing textual analysis, while necessary to achieve catharsis, does not take the most constructive viewpoint of the problems. The positive approach of systems analysis is to create something new out of something old: change is not something to fear but something to use to advantage. Preoccupation with format standards can prevent one from seeing a better solution to the overall problem. Annex 4 (CODIB V) illustrates the reality of the problem in different agencies. There seems to be little doubt that each agency will need more or less data in its records than another agency. There is no technological reason why each agency cannot have information entered, stored, and retrieved in any format of its choice. Annex 4 merely tabulates the differences which the system must accommodate.

From a systems design viewpoint, it would be a mistake to try to force standard formats on every agency, since this is not necessary within the flexible new technology and since there are more significant and difficult technological and management problems to be solved.

F. The Invisible Colleges

There is a strong need for positive interagency cooperation, information exchange and joint enterprise in the biographics realm. We are convinced of this need by observing efforts in several agencies without evidence of mutual knowledge. This impression, which might otherwise be attributed to the superficial character of an inquiry by outsiders, is corroborated by Finding #11 of CODIB Task Force, which states:

"The Team agreed that the professional interchange derived from the Task Force effort was highly valuable to each member in providing new

insights in manual and machine techniques, interagency channels, sources of information and policies of other agencies."

A similar reaction was observed by the Panel in the course of a meeting on March 29, 1966, which confronted representatives of the Electronic Data Processing arms of NSA, DIA, and CIA, with representatives of the counterintelligence offices in a discus sion of security and compartmentation problems. Invisible colleges seem to be respon sible for the work that does get done but they are not adequate enough in their precarious assistance.

G. Compartmentation and Security

We are convinced that compartmentation is used not only for security reasons but, as the R&D report points out (CODIB VI, p.13) also for administrative reasons masquerading as

> "security barriers that are used quite effectively to barricade against attempts by other agencies' personnel to acquaint themselves with ongoing R&D effort."

The Subpanel has not been able to disentangle the problem of file security from administrative and in-fighting problems. We acknowledge the genuine needs for security and compartmentation, but we suspect that these may have been misused, with adverse effects on community cooperation.

The community clearly recognizes the possible damaging effects of compartmentation, witness the statement:

> "Research in such a limited source file often gives incomplete or outdated information." (CODIB V, p.16).

Anecdotal evidence of the effects of delayed or impossible collation of relevant facts abounds, but we notice a total absence of either a mechanism

for studying this problem or even a genuine concern for it. The CODIB Biographics Task Force report apparently felt constrained to skirt around the problem by making such innocuous recommendations (CODIB V, p.4, item 5) as that "the CODIB Support Staff be directed to prepare and maintain current publications to inform users of biographic information ..." with the hedge that this effort be limited "within the limits of security classification and need-to-know prescribed by each agency." * This recommendation firmly endorses motherhood with zero real effect; in fact, it flatly contradicts the one quoted in the preceding paragraph from page 16 of CODIB V.

H. Conceptual and Managerial Problems

The R&D report rightfully points out that "Conceptual and managerial problems are more crucial than purely technical." (CODIB VI, p.3).

The R&D report further points out that "There is neither an organized set of R&D objectives, a policy for establishing R&D objectives, nor a mechanism for accomplishing either." (CODIB VI, p.5).

It is clear to the Subpanel that the product of one agency or compartment is the input of another; that there are many loops, cycles, interconnections, etc., but that the prevalent concern for local optimization of resources and performance is unmarred by any visible concern for total systems design.

There is an almost total absence of planning data or statistics in a form that would enable management to determine appropriate courses of action. This Panel would welcome a refutation of this statement in the form of appropriate data. For instance, although everyone agrees that the question

* Our emphasis.

of security of shared files is of primary importance, no one can supply useful data or criteria concerning such elementary matters as the relationship between the level of security precautions and expense and the safety acquired at such a level. It is striking, in fact, that the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee regarded this question as a novel one when it was asked during the Security Briefing of the full Panel on March 20, 1966. The data may exist somewhere, but the fact that this Panel was unable to uncover it is itself symptomatic. Elementary facts concerning management techniques should be developed if a decent system is to be designed.

We have dealt briefly elsewhere in this report (Section II, F) with our concern that information processing become less of a stepchild (or tail) of information substance, with the need for users to participate in systems design, with the problems of lack of USIB directions enforced consensus and lowest common denominator, with the need for a probabilistic view of collection and retrieval, and with the need for introducing competence and understanding of systems design problems at the highest level of management.

At the root of much of the uneasiness over the introduction of automatic information processing technique there seems to be a fear, not only about the matter of security, but also about agency or management authority. After all, folk wisdom tells us that knowledge is power.

This is a valid concern, but we suggest that it can be exaggerated, and that the fear is, to a large extent, fear of the unknown. While there are legitimate reasons to guard information, at least part of this

concern arises from a mistaken confusion of information gathering with the exercise of authority. Clearly, the opening of information lines up, down, and across would legitimize a leaping over organizational boundaries that, while essential for real accomplishment, is done nowadays only at official risk and peril (e.g., see Appendix 7c, p.16). Organization lines reflect lines of authority, but while knowledge is power, the gathering of information is not the exercise of authority. It seems, therefore, perfectly proper for a manager to leap several levels down or for a subordinate to leap across organization lines in search of information, so long as decisions and orders travel by normal channels and care is taken to protect legitimate privacy.

This vital question must be faced squarely by top management if real progress is to be made in community-wide information processing.

I. Manpower

The Subpanel believes that there is a serious shortage of skilled manpower applicable to biographic problems. The skills in short supply include both computer systems specialists and biographic specialists. There appears to be a wide variation in competence and experience of these people in the installations visited, and the absence of positive communication channels precludes a sufficient interchange of experience which could help upgrade weaker personnel.

The Subpanel is impressed with the quality of expertise found among senior biographic personnel. However, these specialists appear to

be made, not born, and their skill is the result of extensive on-the-job experience. At the same time, this pool of talent is fragmented along the same lines that the files are. This strikes the Subpanel as an unwarranted division of a critical capability. To have experienced indexers review identical source materials in several agencies and yet have analysts be unable to have a view of the total picture of an individual (CODIB V, p. 13, p. 15; see also Section III, B) strikes the Subpanel as a serious deficiency. We applaud once again the intent of Recommendation #8 of the Biographics Task Team Report which recommends in part,

> "A coordinated program should be developed using EDP methods to provide machine indexes of the bibliographic data processed by any organization in this field, so that the personality information is accessible to a recipient in machine form, with quick followup to the translated source."

Considering the strategic necessity of preeminent capability in biographics, the Subpanel feels that more than good intentions are required.

Therefore, it is recommended that a plan for developing a community-wide biographic capability with the highest professional standards of performance be submitted to PFIAB through the Director of Central Intelligence by 2 January 1967. This plan must include means for upgrading the skills of individuals to a much higher average level, and it must also include plans for adding systems analysts and technological expertise to the important biographic capability. Appendices 5 - 8 of this Report present samples of specific suggestions that should be openly debated among the members of the Community to provide a solid basis for strong top management action.

J. Communications

Recommendation #2 of the Biographics Task Team Report says that each Agency should

> "Study the feasibility of telecommunication links within the national agency check complex to facilitate the exchange of requests and replies."

In this connection, it should be noted that the extent of this problem may have been exaggerated. The figures compiled by the Biographics Task Team reveal that an extraordinarily high percentage of requests addressed to biographic files are returned with an indication that no record could be found (See also Section II, E; Appendices 3, 4). This fraction varies from 80% for Civil Service Commission files to a low of 2% for DIA files. For positive intelligence requests, three of the five agencies cited stated that 50% of the responses were no hits. Since a negative response can be communicated by one bit (or none) of information, it strikes this Subpanel that neither traffic density nor security plays a major role and that current time delays are outlandish (See also Appendix 5a, p. 2, para. 4). There is no evidence concerning how many of the no-hit responses are due to the diversification and multiplicity of the files.

This Subpanel believes that the telecommunications links are obviously feasible and that there is no need to study anything except the costs and the configuration desired. This is routine engineering work once management decides what it wants on the basis of firmly directed, professionally competent and candid staff work.

K. An Approach to Security Problems.

We note with pleasure a tradition and an experiment which suggest that the security problem for biographic files may be tractable. The Biographic Task Team Report points out that

> "Information about individuals comes from a great diversity of sources, through a large number of channels, and has been stored in a variety of retrieval systems in diverse formats." (CODIB V, p. 6, item 1).

The Report then goes on to point out that

> "These have traditionally taken the form of index references, either self-contained, or leading to dossier files or to individual documents."

Here the tradition of the Community seems in complete accord with the needs of a readily accessible, mechanized or unmechanized, biographic file system. The CIA experience with [redacted] and its associated systems reinforces this impression. The [redacted] file contains biographic documents of various security classifications to which access is controlled by different compartments. There is, as we understand it, a separate unified index to these collections, but security compartmentation is still maintained within the index as a safeguard. 25X1 25X1

The separation of index and dossier leads naturally to the concept of free search on the index with a filter at the output. This is, in fact, the way in which the [redacted] file operates. Anyone who is authorized to use this file has access to the index, but when a hit is made in the file, only items which the requester is authorized to see are returned to him - the 25X1

others are sent to a control point and the requester is notified that he must seek permission of the controller to have access to the data if he is qualified to have it. At least the requester knows there is something to go after; hence if he decides to insist on seeing the material, he has a position from which to insist. The separation of index and dossier also leads naturally into a stratified retrieval technique which could minimize the restraint of security problems on the pace of mechanization. Index files are considerably less voluminous than dossier files and the one can be mechanized or not independently of the other. Together, with the use of various advanced transmission techniques, this may lead to reasonable technological solutions.

The fact that this kind of system can work in such a sensitive area is most encouraging. The fact that this technique seems to be unique illustrates how slowly ideas travel even on innocuous matters of technique. COINS is presently trying to grapple with some of the problems of adding biographic files to the system. It should be instructive to study their selection of files for inclusion in the system. Except for large dossier-type files, there should be no particular bias except that of cost and utility. Technological and security problems normally arising with biographic files or raised by some degree of consolidation should not present any serious technological barriers.

The implication of the [redacted] approach is quite serious. Its example suggests that, in principle, the notions of index mechanization and of free index search can be adopted in the community wherever a systems

25X1

study reveals its potential usefulness and economy. The material in dossiers may then be kept at any level of classification, subject to appropriate output filtering. The requester can be notified that material is immediately available; that there are more hits, but that he should consult the controller for permission to see these.

The importance of this technique lies in the fact that access to otherwise denied files is at best a passive matter without it. An analyst may send out a request for information and may hit a very sensitive file. Those who control the file may, if they feel so inclined, take his request seriously, sanitize the material, and make it available to him. This is, in principle, the role that controllers resident in groups that keep sensitive files play in substantive production areas. Given the general climate in the community, however, we suspect that the tendency to give no response or only minimal service in the face of great trouble or threat of competition is very great indeed. A detailed and candid analysis of how such requests are actually handled is not available, but this Subpanel would be delighted to have this point refuted.

Positive information about hits is invaluable as a means for providing great pressure for a request to be filled without creating a central authority (hence, without the disadvantages inherent in centralization). An analyst who knows that someone else holds material that may be interesting to him and that he has the right and the duty to request access to such material unless positively denied by security rules, is likely to be far more

alert and diligent in digging out this information and exercising pressure via his superiors than if he is at the mercy of passive responses to a broadcast request. The labor of justifying a denial under these circumstances may also counterbalance the labor of sanitizing material to make it available.

The example of the [redacted] file approach thus offers potential 25X1 advantages both to those who must maintain security of the file and to the user who needs access to all information which he is justified in having. The [redacted] approach is also an outstanding example of a farsighted 25X1 information processing policy which makes judicious use of technology to stay ahead of the problem.

L. File Conversion

The enormous size of present biographic files creates a major problem in automation. This problem grows with every delay and so does the waste inherent in filing material that will later need to be converted. Conversion from manual, or partially manual, files to machine systems is hindered by the effort required. It is interesting, in this connection, to observe that the excellent principle of conversion of minimal usable files has, either consciously or unconsciously, been followed in some of the experimental situations we have seen.

One of the problems that must be considered in doing conversion is that of maintaining usable files at all times during the conversion process. This Subpanel noticed that some installations have managed to convert their

files, or are in the process of doing so, while others are wringing their hands and pointing to the differences which ostensibly prevent them from starting a conversion effort (Appendices 5c, 7c).

While it is not necessarily true that the totality of all files should be converted, it is nevertheless true that no fundamental technological problems prevent conversion. The Subpanel was also encouraged by finding that stiff directives from high authority (e.g., at Fort Holabird, See Section VI F) have had great effect in overcoming nontechnological obstacles of all types. The implication is that the community is not nearly as helpless as appearances are, as we see it, intended to suggest.

For instance, on page 13 of the CODIB Report on the SCIPS Study (CODIB 1964), the following statement is quoted from the SCIPS Report:

> "The most pressing problems of systems integration or interface appear to be between components within agencies rather than between agencies."

The CODIB comment concurs, but with a hedged statement:

> "This statement is probably true and deserves careful consideration. This is not to say that information processing does not warrant community consideration to a considerably greater degree than it has had to date -- it does; but this finding reflects a logical first-things-first philosophy."

In the light of our analysis of CODIB's history in the absence of strong USIB direction, we see this as clearly killing with kindness.

The biographics area is such that it is by no means clear-cut that more can be done within an agency than across agency lines. This Subpanel recommends that top management have this question tested

experimentally. However, what we see as a remarkably refined CODIB ability to adapt to its predicament by relegating reports to limbo, watering down findings, and pulling the teeth out of recommendations, must be overcome by strong management direction of the course of such an experiment.

In conclusion, this Subpanel recommends that file conversion studies be integral to any interagency biographic file automation experiment. The cost and effort required for file conversion will not decrease in time -- it will increase; the resulting strain on manpower resources will grow higher. Hence, a major effort should be initiated to convert manual biographic files on a large scale in the community. The experience and the data obtained will be very helpful in other file conversion efforts outside of biographics.

CODIB V: Report, T/V/R-1 dated 17 January 1966 of Task Team V (Bibliographics) of the Committee on Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board (CODIB) (S&T Cont. No. 0142) (Stamped "DRAFT"), (Revise to latest version sent by Landau/Borel 6/66).

CODIB VI: Report T/VI/R-1, dated 28 September 1965 of Task Team VI (Intelligence Data Handling Research and Development) of the Committee on Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board (CODIB) (S&T Cont. No. 1586). See also an expurgated version of this report published in Spring 1966 (CODIB VIa).

CODIB VIa: "R&D for Intelligence Processing", Studies in Intelligence Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1966, CIA Office of Training, pp. 43-55.(S&T Cont. No. 1567) (See also unexpurgated version, CODIB VI).

CODIB 1961: CODIB Third Annual Report, 30 June 1961, Serial No. CODIB-AR-3.

CODIB 1962a: CODIB Fourth Annual Report, 31 July 1962, Serial No. CODIB-AR-4.

CODIB 1962b: Information Processing Programs in USIB Member Agencies (Appendix C of CODIB 1962a).

CODIB 1963: CODIB Fifth Annual Report, 5 September 1963, Serial No. CODIB-AR-5.

CODIB 1964: United States Intelligence Board Committee on Documentation "Stage 1 Report of the Staff for the Community Information Processing Study (SCIPS)" USIB-D-39.7/5 CODIB-D-82/28, 26 February 1964.

CODIB 1965a: CODIB Draft Task Team Quarterly Report for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 September 1965, Serial No. CODIB-D-112/5, 1 November 1965, Limited Distribution.

CODIB 1965b: CODIB Seventh Annual Report, 3 December 1965, Serial No. CODIB-AR-7.

CODIB 1966: CODIB Draft Task Team Quarterly Report for the period 1 October to 31 December 1965. Serial No. CODIB-D-112/6, 18 January 1966, Limited Distribution.

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SCIPS 1963: Staff for the Community Information Processing Study (SCIPS) Stage 1, Report, Vol. II, Oct. 1963 (SC No. 12481/63, 15 January 1964), pp. 57-70.

APPENDICES

1 through 9

(See p. ii, Table of Contents)

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CONFIDENTIAL

26 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director of Central Reference

SUBJECT: COINS/ELITE Information

1. Today I received from the D/CR a directive limiting BR's use of O/T during the remainder of FY 67 (8 months) to 1000 hours, a reduction of close to 60%. The suggestion was included that 500 hours be reserved for production flaps and the remaining 500 hours devoted to input processing and "other programs." Such a drastic cutback in O/T makes even more improbable the completion of the Register's Elite Project before mid-1967 (let alone the originally estimated December 1966 completion date) unless there is an assignment of O/T priority for the project and/or the temporary detail of other qualified OCR personnel to the project (as noted in my Second Progress Report of 7 October 1966).

2. On the other hand, and especially since Mr. Vance will be attending the 3 November CODIB Meeting at which [redacted] will brief on the "Status of COINS," I have heard informally that 25X1

a) Commo is experiencing communication difficulties which will delay the operational date of COINS Phase I (tying CIA into COINS) "until at least June;" and that

b) DIA will have no money for switching equipment for the COINS network until FY 68 funds become available.

3. I have no details on the points in paragraph (2) above but I thought Mr. Vance should be cognizant of them in the light of the increasingly unrealistic "Elite" dema[redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

Chief, Biographic Register

25X1 [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

IV-3-f-1

ADMINISTRATIVE — INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 November 1966

File

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Reference

THROUGH: Special Assistant to D/CR [redacted] STATINTL

SUBJECT: Disposition of BR's ORI Card File at Records Center

1. In partial response to [redacted] STATINTL questions to you regarding the possible destruction of subject file, I am forwarding the attached portion (the three final pages) of a report transmitted to Chief, MD/CR on 3 August 1966. As you can see, the pages list those BR files for which I had authorized destruction. The ORI file is indicated on page 5, STATINTL plus the agreement that [redacted] and I had reached; namely, BR would be perfectly happy to have the cards converted to tape providing the same service would be available.

2. The size of the file is barely over 600 thousand (not 1 million) and is used to produce the alpha machine indexes (of which there are 22 volumes) [redacted] stored in BR. The file STATINTL is active in that it must remain available for updating. Thirteen updated volumes (K thru Z) were received from MD in March 1966. Jim estimates that he also punched 25,000 new entries during the past year.

3. Regarding the "ORI tape" which Lou says is available in DIA. STATINTL [redacted] states that the original ORI base has been merged in with DIA's STATINTL [redacted] and is not, to his knowledge, retrievable in its original form. If the present EAM file were destroyed, another would have to be started, thereby at least doubling the number of sources which BR analysts would have to search.

4. I therefore recommend that the file be kept intact in its present STATINTL form until it is possible to convert it to tape. [redacted] said he had already given Lou this decision.

STATINTL [redacted]

Chief, Biographic Register

Attachment

ADMINISTRATIVE — INTERNAL USE ONLY